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"SOME COMMENTS ON LABOUR BOARDS
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW"
By HowARD SNOW*
In early July, 1975, the Ontario Legislature considered amendments to
The Labour Relations Act.1 One of the proposed amendments, and the only
one which was not enacted, was a provision to further exclude the role of the
courts in labour arbitration. 2 I recall a friend asking me at the time why
labour lawyers were so often complaining of the influence of the judiciary and
advocating the removal of labour law from the courts. In other areas of the
law a "wrong" decision in the courts evokes comment on that decision but
rarely does anyone suggest that the correct solution is to remove the courts
altogether from the issues involved. The usual arguments as to the need for
speed and final resolution of issues, together with reliance on the expertise
present in the labour field did not convince my friend. The courts are no
slower in labour law than they are in criminal law, for instance, and the local
magistrate soon develops a great deal of expertise in dealing with criminals
and the police.
As often happens, shortly after losing an argument one knows should
have been won, one finds something that says everything that could be asked
for and says it so much better than anyone else could ever hope to say it.
In this case, the something is Professor Paul Weiler's chapter on "The
Supreme Court and Canadian Labour Law", which is the fifth chapter in his
book In the Last Resort. Professor Weiler makes a complete and convincing
argument about what has been wrong with the intervention of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the last 25 years. He advocates that the Court ought to
take a position of judicial restraint, one of extreme caution, in interfering in
the area of labour relations. Although not an exhaustive study, he does detail
sufficient cases to demonstrate convincingly that the Supreme Court has been
somewhat of a hindrance in the development of our labour law system.
I do not intend to summarize the chapter since it is reasonably short and
ought to be read in full by anyone with an interest in the Supreme Court or
in public law generally. Professor Weiler makes the point that Bora Laskin,
now the Chief Justice of Canada, was Canada's leading labour law scholar in
the 1950's, and that Harry Arthurs, Dean of Osgoode Hall Law School, was
in the 1960's. Since Professor Weiler may well turn out to be the 1970's
version, I recommend his chapter on labour law to be read by anyone interested in the field.
* Mr. Snow is a LL.M. student at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.

'R.S.O. 1970, c. 232. Most of the proposed amendments were enacted as S.O. 1975,
c.76.
2Bill 111, 1975, s. 10, which proposed new s. 37(12) and (13). These proposals
were defeated at the committee stage, in part it would appear, because the Minister of
Labour was not convinced of their merits.
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Having expressed my feelings on the article, I will make some general
comments which are not intended to conflict with the views expressed earlier.
The general thrust is to set the chapter in its proper perspective and then to
comment on how well, in fact, the other factors in the labour law area,
(principally the Ontario Labour Relations Board) are performing.
Firstly, although Professor Weiler entitles the chapter "The Supervisor
of the Administrative Process", his argument centres on the supervision of
Ontario labour relations law, and some care might be taken in applying his
conclusions to other areas of administrative law or to other jurisdictions.
Professor Weiler subtitles the chapter "The Supreme Court and Canadian Labour Law" and it is limited to the collective relationships regulated
by such bodies as the Ontario Labour Relations Board. The chapter has
little application to the law as it relates to the millions of unorganized (nonunion) Canadian workers. It also has no particular application to such
administrative agencies as the Unemployment Insurance Commission, which
regulates some aspects of the law as it relates to persons employed in a collective relationship.
I wish to take exception with Professor Weiler's assertion that "free
collective bargaining is the rationale of the existing legal structure"3 and that
"anyone acquainted with the evolution and present structure of modem labour
legislation must recognize that this is the theory which underlies its many
detailed provisions". 4 Taken together, these statements give the impression
that our legislators felt that free collective bargaining was a desirable goal
and thus enacted the present legislation to set up this free collective bargaining system. Since Professor Weiler deals mainly with judicial review arising
out of the operation of The Ontario Labour Relations Act,5 and since that
statute enacts one of the freer collective bargaining schemes, 6 it should be
examined briefly to see if it really does enact a scheme which leads to "free
collective bargaining". Professor Weiler asserts that it is free on two grounds: 7
first, that employees are free to accept or reject the union as a bargaining
agent, and secondly, that the government does not set or control the terms
of the bargain.
With regard to the first freedom, note that under The Ontario Labour
Relations Act, "trade union" has a particular meaning and if an organization
does not meet these requirements, its members cannot avail themselves of the
Act. If it is a trade union, an appropriate bargaining unit must still be detersP. Weiler, In the Last Resort, A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada,
(Toronto: Carswell/Methuen, 1974) at 123.
4
5

1 d.
R.S.O. 1970, c. 232, as am. by S.O. 1975, c. 76.

0For comparison in Ontario, see the situation of the teachers (The School Boards
& Teachers Collective NegotiationsAct, 1975, S.O. 1975, c. 72), police (The Police Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 351, as am. by S.O. 1972, c. 103), crown employees (The Crown
Employees Collective BargainingAct, S.O. 1972, c. 67, as am. by S.O. 1974, c. 135),
and hospital workers (Hospital Labour Disputes Arbitration Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 208,
as am. by S.O. 1972, c. 152).
7Supra, note 3 at 123.
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mined, subject always to the views of the Board (s. 6). A minimum percentage of membership in the union must be demonstrated (ss. 7,8) and sometimes the parties are subjected to an election campaign where management
can campaign against the trade union, although the union and management
are somewhat restricted in what they may do (especially by the unfair labour
practices section, ss. 56-72). Should the trade union lose, it may not be free
to reapply for some time (s. 92(2) (1)), and should it win, its victory may
be subject to objection by the other parties before the Board, or to review
before the courts.
Once the trade union is certified as the bargaining agent, Professor
Weiler says the government allows the parties to make their own bargain.
However, the union must give written notice to bargain (s. 13) and the
parties must bargain in good faith (s. 14). The Act deems every collective
agreement to include a clause recognizing the trade union as bargaining agent
for the employees (s. 35(1)), and the agreement must provide that there
will be no strikes or lockouts; any dispute arising during the term of the
agreement must be resolved by arbitration. Should the agreement fail to contain these provisions the Act deems them to be included. If the arbitration
clause is inadequate, the Board can change it (ss. 36, 37). Finally, the agreement must run for at least one year (s. 44). In the recent amendments, a
provision was included providing that an employer must check-off union dues
of the employees if (a) the union requests the provision be included in the
agreement and (b) the employee requests that the dues be deducted (s. 36a).
(Whether this last provision applies to future collective agreements only, or
whether it can be forced upon an employer under an existing collective agreement is an open question, but it appears that a union can now, at its option,
change an existing collective agreement. If a check-off provision is thought to
be desirable there is no reason why the date of the signing of the agreement
should have any decisive effect on the union's entitlement to it.)
As a further, and ongoing, example of the "freedom" of the workers to
choose whatever union they may wish, the case of Canron Ltd., Eastern
Structural Division8 should be examined. The Canadian Workers Union
(C.W.U.) is a relatively new union and applied in April, 1975, to take over
as bargaining agent from the incumbent union, the Ironworkers9 . The C.W.U.
showed considerable support and obtained a vote of the employees prior to
the holding of a hearing by the Board. The ballots have yet to be counted as
8

(1975) O.L.R.B. 421. It is possible to argue that the C.W.U. is a poor example

to use to demonstrate a valid point in that the C.W.U. is some sort of aberration
among trade unions - an organization not resembling a true trade union in any way.
In my view, such an opinion is a value judgment on the proper role of a trade union
which I am unable to share. It is only an aberration in the degree of difference between
its views and those of more conventional unions and although I do not personally share
all of its views I am of the opinion that the conventional unions are becoming too

much a part of the status quo and failing to adequately perform a role as a catalyst
for change in society, the C.W.U. therefore encounters more problems and problems of
increased severity in attempting to deal with the Board and the existing social and

legal structures.
9 Note that employees are only "free" to change unions at certain times, s. 5, of
The Labour Relations Act of Ontario.
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the case has been delayed on a number of points and is headed to court on
several issues. In the meantime, the Board has held numerous days of hearings to determine, among other things, if the union is a union, whether the
vote was properly conducted, and so on. The C.W.U. has frequently requested
that the votes be counted, presumably because if they lose they need not
waste the time and money in fighting the case through the Board's procedures
and into the courts. At this time no one knows whether or not it is all in vain.
The important point, however, is that the workers at Canron are for all intents and purposes without any effective representation. The questions we
must ask are whether they are free to choose who they want as their bargaining
agent, and having made that choice, whether they are free to settle a collective
agreement on any terms they and the employer would like to include.
One view of the term "free collective bargaining" might give the impression that those employees who wished to do so could negotiate as a group
with their employer. One would then think that those who did not so desire
would be free to continue individually or to band together with another group.
This, however, is not the case. No collective action can take place unless a
majority is in favour of it and selects a union (for they cannot bargain except
through the vehicle of a union); the minority is free to do nothing but to
protest. They must go along with the majority view.
Finally, we might question just how accurate the term "free collective
bargaining" is in reflecting the process of negotiation that takes place. While
no doubt, bargaining takes place and is very important to the process, it is
characterized by an unusual show of force, a great deal of posturing and
bluffing, and then, late in the game, after a great deal of ritualistic activity,
an agreement is reached which either party and any well-informed observer
could likely have guessed at weeks or even months earlier. Unfortunately, the
name provides no mention of a part of the process sometimes considered the
most important factor motivating the parties to reach agreement - the strike.
Both unions and employers have argued that bargaining without strikes is
not workable and since strikes are a method of inflicting economic harm on
the other side, there is an argument to be made that our system should be
called "free collective infliction of economic harm".' 0
The important point, I suppose, is not what the system is called, as long
as everyone is agreed on what it is and how it operates. What is deceptive is
the statement that free collective bargaining is the rationale for our present
system. This tends to give the impression that our learned legislators looked
over available systems and, seeing how good free collective bargaining was,
enacted the present legislative scheme.
I submit the rationale behind our system is a desire by the legislators to
give as little as possible, after the longest wait possible, (but often shortly
10 1 do not suggest that strikes are of no value in and of themselves. I appreciate
that the argument can be made that apart from being an important motivating factor,
a strike as a form of conflict is a positive good. See for example, "The Significance of
Human Conflict", in the Public Employee Relations Library, Behavioural Approaches to
Employee Relations (#22) (Chicago: Public Employee Relations Library, 1970) at 6.
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before an election), and only after a long and loud outcry by the interested
parties. Thus, for instance, I submit that Ontario's recent amendments arose
not from a realization that the amendments were meritorious in their own
right and deserved to be enacted to ensure the better operation of the free
collective bargaining system, but rather in response to lobbying by pro-union
interests, the government's poor public support, and the impending provincial
election. Perhaps a more obvious example is The School Boards and Teachers
Collective Negotiations Act, 1975, which like the amendments to The Ontario

Labour Relations Act, passed the last day of the session prior to the election,
and only after hard lobbying by the teachers. This is the first statutory bargaining scheme for Ontario's teachers and followed a previous attempt of the
Conservative government to set up a scheme which would end in compulsory
arbitration, introduced in Bill 275, 1963. Bill 275 failed to gain enactment
following, among other things, a massive rally of teachers and a march on
Queen's Park to oppose it, and the opposition of the Ontario School Trustees
Council and the Ontario Association of Education Administrative Officials.
Having discussed both what the system is (i.e., a highly regimented,
technical, legalistic system11 designed to give as little as possible to appease
the workers), and its origins, it is worthwhile to examine how well the system
is being administered by the body primarily responsible for the administration
of the legislation - the Ontario Labour Relations Board.
The first point is that Professor Weiler seems to feel the tripartite Board
is equally well suited to all issues coming before it and, as for the desired
judicial intervention, only distinguishes between the types of mistakes involved' and not the substantial issue. The Board sits in panels of three,
composed of one representative of employers, one of employees (unions),
and a "neutral" chairman.' 3 The normal dispute will involve a union on one
side and management on the other. In that instance, the format is fine. However, when the dispute is between an employee and his union, the format of
the Board is not as well suited for the impartial resolution of the issues. Suppose, for example, that an employee complains that the union refused to
pursue his grievance, contrary to section 60 of The Ontario Labour Relations
Act. To be successful before the Labour Relations Board he would normally
have to convince two members of the panel that (1) he was treated unfairly
by the employer and (2) that the union was thus wrong and arbitrary in
dropping his grievance. He must thus convince one of the two "non-neutral"
members that the particular party whose interests he represents acted illegally.
Thus the situation is one where the two members other than the chairman or
vice-chairman can, and have, voted together against the decision of the
111 might point out that the police, civil servants and others do not come even
as close to "free collective bargaining" as do those who fall under The Labour Relations

Act of Ontario.
12

Such as review of the administrative procedure, rather than the merits of the

case.
13 The Labour Relations Act, s. 91(9).
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"neutral" chairman to defeat the employee's complaint.1 4 The Legislature has
apparently responded to this type of problem and due to the recent amendments the case may now possibly be heard by the "neutral" chairman or vicechairman sitting alone.' 5 This power to do so is both limited and discretionary
and it is too early to determine how much use the Board will make of it or its
effects. The point to be made is that although the Supreme Court may not be
doing the best possible job in labour relations, the Board itself may be unsuited
to handle some of its present tasks.
A similar point to be made about the Board is that although the Board
is a fairly specialized tribunal, it makes little or no attempt on its own behalf
to find out exactly what the effect of the Board's decisions will be or have
been in the past. For instance, although given a wide range of remedies to
cure "unfair labour practices"' 6 little or no effort is made by the Board to
determine how effective any particular remedy may be. Therefore, while the
Board may deal with the area of labour law on a regular basis, there is little
than the courts what ought
compelling argument that the Board knows better
1
to be done to correct unfair labour practices.
A further related point is Professor Weiler's characterization of the
Board as an administrative agency. "Administrative" is normally used to
distinguish the body from a judicial one. Simply put, an administrative body
regulates a specific area of society, often moving on its own accord, conducting inquiries and making decisions on the basis of policy considerations and
a wide discretion. A judicial body waits for someone to bring forward a complaint which is heard using the adversarial system and the decision is based
mainly on law and precedent. One which falls somewhere in the middle is
often called "quasi-judicial". It is generally felt that administrative functions
are not amenable to review by the courts in the same way that judicial func14 E.g., Robert E. Gibb v. United Brewers Warehousing Workers' Provincial
Board et al., Ontario Labour Relations Board file no. 5345-73-U., as yet unreported,
where Vice-Chairman Boscariol dissented, being of the opinion that the complainant
had made out a prima facie case of discrimination by the union in negotiating a new
agreement. Members Bell and Hodges dismissed the complaint without hearing from the
respondent, since they felt the evidence was not such that the respondent should be
called upon to give an explanation. The decision does not make it clear as to the nature
of the proceeding, but since the Board gave reasons only after being requested to do so,
and from the use of the standard of a prima facie case, it would appear that it may
be a consent to prosecute application under The Labour Relations Act, s. 90. If that is
so, I can only guess at why an employee wishes to prosecute his union, but one suggestion might be that he feels he cannot convince the Board he has any more than a
prima facie case, whereas he could convince a judge beyond a reasonable doubt.
15S. 91 (11)(a), enacted by S.O. 1975, c. 76, s. 24.
16 The Labour Relations Act, s. 79(4). Note that this wide range has been recently
increased so that the Board now "shall determine what, if anything" the guilty party
"shall do or refrain from doing with respect thereto" and then gives some specific
examples of the remedies, such as a cease and desist order, an order to rectify the acts
complained of, to reinstate or rehire, and pay compensation.
17 The matter of empirical research is one of general application and the Board
has made no study to determine how effective the legislation it administers is in
practice.
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tions are. I will thus set out some features of the Board which cause me to
believe the Board conforms much more closely to a judicial model than an
administrative model.
The Board will and has decided important cases, in part at least by
excluding certain testimony on the basis that it was hearsay and that its prejudicial value exceeded its probative value.' 8 Following two votes of the
employees at Dorothea and court action to compel the attendance by a Board
official (who was not in fact called to testify), the case turned on whether or
not a union representative could testify as to employee responses made to her
concerning the employees' awareness of the company position with respect to
the status of a particular employee.' 9 The union claimed the employees were
too frightened to attend the hearing and testify themselves. 20 Whether the
decision to exclude the testimony is correct or not,2 1 it seems to indicate that
the Board views its own role as very much a judicial one, deciding cases
brought before it on the basis of admissible evidence that the parties can
adduce. In so doing the Board fashions rules as to admissibility in much the
same manner as a court does. If the Board is to act essentially as a court
22
does then it may be that its decisions are in fact amenable to judicial review.
There may be some cause for concern in that some of the people who appear
before the Board lack confidence in the Board's impartiality. As might be
expected the parties who appear before the Board regularly become familiar
with the Board, and the Board becomes familiar with the parties. Thus, when
new parties appear on the scene they may feel as if they are breaking into a
18 Canadian Textile & Chemical Union v. Dorothea Knitting Mills Ltd., Board
file no. 4880-73-R, as yet unreported. An interesting side note is the ringing dissent of
Board member P. J. O'Keeffe which ought to be read by anyone interested in the increasingly legalistic stance of the Board. From an addendum, it would appear that this
dissent is toned down somewhat from its first draft. Since the decision as issued included passages such as "the story ... is indeed a sorry tale of the firing of a young
female factory employee who was unfortunate enough to be named by her union as
a scrutineer in a lawful employee representation vote. For her pains she was discharged, bullied by legal counsel, and her head 'spiked at the Tower gate' as a horrible
example to other employes of the fate awaiting union activists", it would perhaps be
unwise to speculate as to what was in the draft dissent.
19 The same employee whom Mr. O'Keeffe says had her head "spiked at the
Tower gate" etc., supra, note 18.
20
Mr. O'Keeffe in his dissent, after mentioning threats to cut out an employee's
heart, said: "In the light of this industrial horror and terror atmosphere, it would be
foolhardy for any employee to come forward to give evidence with respect to any of
the actions of this company." Decision, August 7, 1975, para. 30 at 26.
21
Although I think it is probably wrong on policy and in principle, it is not obviously erroneous or completely unreasonable.
22 A related point, worthy of passing comment, is that Professor Weiler states the
Board is presided over by legally-trained chairmen. At the time that was written, it was
correct, but the most recent appointee as a vice-chairman to the Ontario Labour Relations Board is the first non-lawyer to be appointed. How much this will affect the argument Professor Weiler adopts from Abbott, J., in Barbara Jarvis v. Associated Medical
Services Ltd. et al., [1964] S.C.R. 497, 44 D.L.R. (2d) 407, (that the Board is as
capable of deciding cases as a judge, in part because it is presided over by a legallytrained chairman), would depend on whether this is to become a common practice, and
how much value one puts on having legally-trained chairmen.
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closed circle and the Board may have considerable trouble in coping with
such sentiments. An excellent recent (and continuing) example is the relatively new Canadian Workers Union. The C.W.U., so it is alleged, is the
"trade union puppet" of a Canadian communist organization, the Canadian
Liberation Movement. In any event, the approach of the C.W.U. and its
leaders is not that of the more orthodox trade unions. The C.W.U. espouses
a more radical ideology than, and is opposed to, the international unions that
generally control the labour movement and which have considerable representation on the Labour Board. Two of the C.W.U.'s recent certification applications23 have provided considerable problems for the Board. 2 4 If the Board
should continue to cope and to arrive at decisions in these cases that all the
diverse parties feel are reasonable, ("right" being too much to hope for),
then the Board shall have done an admirable job. However, I have little faith
that such a result will be possible. 25 In circumstances such as these I think
having some reasonable sort of review available to the C.W.U. (and the other
helping to increase the acceptability of the whole system
parties) may 2be
0
to the parties.
However, any reservations I may have about the present Board structure
and the job it is doing do not in the least detract from Professor Weiler's
analysis of the quality of judicial review we have in the past received from
the Supreme Court of Canada. Should Professor Weiler's plea for judicial
restraint not prevail, one can only hope that the quality of judicial decisionmaking may improve.
23 The Canron Ltd. Eastern Structural Division case, supra, note 8, and the Frankel
Structural Steel Ltd. case (1975), O.L.R.B. 418.
24 For example, numerous days of hearings, generally characterized by shouting
and insults; the need to call in the police to retain order; the bringing of contempt
proceedings against the Board's Chairman and Registrar; and pursuing witnesses
through subpoenas to the level of the Ontario Court of Appeal to compel attendence.
2 As an example of the parties' faith in the Canron case, at times three separate
transcripts are being taken (by the Board, the Applicant, and the Respondent). In the
usual cases no transcript at all is taken, so one can only assume that some use is
intended for them, possibly in judical review proceedings.
20It may be that "Canadian" unions are less happy with the Board than are the
international unions which are based in the United States. The Toronto Globe & Mail
of September 24, 1975, reports on a press conference at which the President of the
Canadian Textile and Chemical Union (C.T.C.U.) reportedly called the Board a
"thieves' kitchen for company lawyers", and openly questioned the Board's impartiality.
The complaint arises out of a "decertification" of the C.T.C.U. at Artistic Woodwork
Co. Ltd. A strike by the C.T.C.U. at Artistic was recently a "cause celebre' in Toronto.
The C.T.C.U. was the union involved in the Dorothea case, supra, note 18.

